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, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18372,
2001 WL 914019 (9th Cir. 2001). [PDF]
$[Lexis]
$[Westlaw]
Summary: The Ninth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment to the defendant employer because the plaintiff, who claimed a work-related repetitive stress injury, presented no issue of material fact showing a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court noted that the reporter was not limited in the major life activity of working because she was able to secure employment in other lines of work.
, 527 U.S. 555
(1999).
Summary:
The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff, a truck driver with monocular vision,
had not established that he was disabled under the ADA because he did not present
evidence of the extent of his visual impairment. The Court emphasized the ADA’s
mandate that courts "determine the existence of disabilities on a case-by-case
basis."
, 526 U.S. 795 (U.S. 1999). [LII]
$[Lexis]
$[Westlaw]
Summary: The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits did not automatically entitle the defendant employer to summary judgment in a claim seeking reasonable accommodations under the ADA. The plaintiff had made apparently inconsistent statements by representing herself as totally disabled in order to receive social security benefits and later claiming to be a "qualified individual" who is able to perform the "essential functions" of her job in order to state a claim under the ADA. Reasoning that the ADA and the Social Security Act were aimed at different purposes and that the ADA’s definition of a "qualified individual with a disability" is meant to take reasonable accommodations into account, the Court held that the plaintiff may survive a summary judgment motion if inconsistent statements about her disability are sufficiently explained.
, 196
F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 1999).
Summary:
The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff must show that the apparent inconsistency
between statements about his disability "can be resolved with reference to variance
between the definitions of ‘disability’ contemplated by the ADA and SSDI." The
court warned that it "will not assume that such a contradiction can be resolved
in the absence of direct explanation."
, 2000
WL 781857 (Mass.Super. 2000).
Summary:
Although the plaintiff provided no evidence or explanation for the inconsistency
of her statements regarding her disability, given "the seemingly low hurdle
enunciated by Cleveland," the court found that a reasonable juror could, "assuming
the truth of, or the plaintiff’s good faith belief in, her statements," conclude
that she could perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable
accommodation.
, 2000 WL 1300396 (D.N.J. 2000).
Summary:
The court held that the plaintiff’s specific, factual statements regarding his
physical condition were not covered by the holding in Cleveland.
, 2000 WL
1456736 (E.D.Pa. 2000).
Summary:
The plaintiff’s previous statements that he was "permanently disabled from railroad
employment" and that he had suffered "a permanent loss of his earning capacity"
were characterized as factual by the court. As a result, the Cleveland holding
did not apply.
2003
Cal. LEXIS 1131 (Cal. 2003) $[Lexis]
Summary: The California Supreme Court clarified that the state's broader
definition of "disabled" has been in effect at least since
1992, when the legislature first amended the definition. California law defines
"disabled" as "limited
in a major life activity" rather than specifically requiring a "substantial"
limitation as federal law does. Lower California courts had been in disagreement
over
whether the broader definition was instituted by the legislature in 1992 or
2001. The Supreme Court held that the 2001 enactment was intended only to clarify
that the state standard is much broader than the federal standard. The court
held that the change had in fact been effectuated by the 1992 amendment. An
attorney for a California employers' group estimated that the ruling
would affect a few hundred pending cases that arose before the 2001 law went
into effect. The state's broader definition of disability may include
many people, such as those
2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20164 (D. Neb. 2001). $[Lexis]
Summary:
An automotive equipment operator with chronic back pain sued his employer for
failing to accommodate his doctor-recommended restrictions on frequent twisting
and bending, and lifting objects weighing more than 40 pounds. The court granted
the employer's motion for summary judgment. The court found that because each
of the employee's impairments prevented him from performing essential functions
of the job, the necessary accommodations would amount to a restructuring of
the job. Thus, the employee's requested accommodations were unreasonable.
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22811 (S.D. Ind. 2001). $[Lexis]
Summary:
The plaintiff alleged that his fibromyalgia affected "almost all life activities
having to do with motion," including the major life activities of walking, sitting,
and standing. He also asserted that his condition limited his ability to socialize,
drive, have a full range of motion, and sleep normally. The court held that
the employee failed to show that his fibromyalgia substantially limited any
major life activity, and therefore, he was not disabled as a matter of law.
., 251 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2001). [HTML]
$[Lexis]
$[Westlaw]
Summary:
This case considered the Americans with Disabilities Act claim of a manual and
administrative worker who suffered from chronic back pain. The court held that
the worker was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA because she was unable
to demonstrate that her back injury precluded her from a significant class of
jobs so as to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
, 92 F. Supp. 2d 168 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
$[Lexis]
$[Westlaw]
Summary:
Summary judgment was granted to a defendant employer in a disability discrimination
case involving an employee with a work related injury to his arm and shoulder.
Ward, the employee, claimed a complete disability under the Social Security
Disability Insurance program, but also claimed an ability to work with reasonable
accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court
noted that Ward could not explain this contradiction and held that Ward could
not establish Washington Mills deprived him of a position for which he was qualified.
, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.
Mass. 1999). $[Lexis]
$[Westlaw]
Summary:
An intensive care nurse with a work-related back injury who was taking Percocet
for pain control was able to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.
The court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer
who successfully rebutted plaintiff’s case by showing that her employment
was terminated for the nonpretextual reason of failure to comply with nursing
protocols. Decision was affirmed in the First Circuit, see
234 F.3d 731 [HTML].
, 132 F.3d 1159
(7th Cir. 1997). [LII]
$[Lexis]
$[Westlaw]
Summary:
This case concerns a production line worker with a battery-operated back pain
management device necessitated by an employment injury. The court denied summary
judgment to the defendant employer, noting that plaintiff established an issue
of fact as to his job performance with reasonable accommodations. The plaintiff
also alleged discrimination by defendant’s failure to reassign plaintiff
to a less demanding position. On this point, summary judgment was granted to
the employer because plaintiff was unable to identify a vacant position that
he could fill.
, 129 F.3d 857 (6th Cir. 1997) [LII]
$[Lexis]
$[Westlaw]
Summary:
Opinion affirms the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of an employer who was charged with failure to accommodate under the ADA. Smith,
an Ameritech employee who suffered chronic back pain due to an automobile accident,
alleged that Ameritech discriminated against him by failing to provide reasonable
accommodations under the ADA. The Sixth Circuit held that there was no genuine
issue of fact as to whether Smith was an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability and noted that Smith failed to show an objectively reasonable accommodation
for his disability.
, 146 F.Supp.2d
961 (N.D. Iowa 2001). [LII]
$[Lexis]
$[Westlaw]
Summary:
This opinion discusses an employer’s motion for summary judgment in a failure
to accommodate disability discrimination claim. Kalskett, the employee, suffered
back pain from an assembly line injury and alleged that Larson Manufacturing
laid her off because the employer did not have a position that would accommodate
her work restrictions. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Larson,
noting that there was no issue of fact as to whether reassignment to a position
as a crew leader was a reasonable accommodation because no such positions were
vacant. The court did, however, find a genuine issue of fact as to whether Kalskett
could perform her job with reasonable accommodations such as permanent light
duty, and denied Larson’s motion for summary judgment on this point.
, No. C00-4141-MWB,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12723 (N.D. Iowa August 22, 2001). $[Lexis]
Summary:
This case involves an ADA claimant suffering from opioid dependence and chronic
pain related to intercostal neuralgia. The court held that the claimant’s
complaint was sufficient to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6)
motion to dismiss because she pleaded a factual basis from which the inference
that she was disabled could be drawn.
, 269 Kan. 456 (2000).
[LII]
$[Lexis]
$[Westlaw]
Summary:
This opinion grants summary judgment to an employer who allegedly failed to
accommodate an employee suffering from chronic pain related to cervical disc
disease. Schall, the employee, was often unable to report to work due to pain
and the pain medications he was taking. The court held that Schall was not a
qualified individual under the ADA because he could not perform the essential
functions of his job and he proffered no evidence of a reasonable accommodation
that would allow him to perform those functions.
,
99 Civ. 1885 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). $[Lexis]
$[Westlaw]
Summary:
This case dismissed the ADA claim of a woman suffering from chronic pain and
musculoskeletal dysfunction related to Fibromyalgia. The court held that plaintiff
failed to prove her prima facie case under the ADA because she alleged she was
substantially limited in the area of exercise, which does not qualify as a major
life activity under the ADA.
, Inc., 2002 WL 1827284 (8/14/02).
Summary: The First Circuit held that the fact that a supervisor mentions an employee's disability in the context of an adverse employment action cannot, without more, constitute direct evidence of discrimination warranting the application of a mixed-motive analysis. The court found that a supervisor’s alleged comments that "[w]e know [the employee] has a disability, but we're just tired of this," and "[w]e understand that you are disabled, but we don’t want you working in this store," did not constitute direct evidence. The court reasoned that the statements were subject to the interpretation that management fully understood that the employee had a disability but could no longer abide her gross and repeated absenteeism. For statements to constitute direct evidence warranting a mixed motive analysis, they must not be inherently ambiguous. Rather, the statements must give the court a high degree of assurance that the employee’s termination was attributable to discrimination.
, 294 F.3d 231 (2002).
Summary: The First Circuit held that a managerial salesman with job-related stress and anxiety disorder failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA or the Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute because he was not disabled within the meaning of the laws. The court found that, at most, Carroll had shown that he could not handle the duties of his position during a particular period of time. He failed to present evidence that he was unable to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Carroll argued that he was precluded from sales manager positions generally, but the court found that even if he was disqualified from the narrow range of jobs as a sales manager, he was not substantially limited in his ability to work.
, 2002 WL 1874834 (2002).
Summary: The Maine U.S. District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer after concluding that the plaintiff’s back condition did not prevent him from working either in an entire class of jobs or in a broad range of jobs in various classes. The court expressed its discomfort with the concept that "working" can be regarded as a major life activity, but did not reach the question in this case.
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